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Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

Strengthening of the United Nations system

Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

Events of the past year have confirmed my view that developing civilian capacity is crucial for the global journey away from conflict. Without nationally owned transformation of the institutions that provide citizens with political representation, security, justice and economic opportunities, there can be no sustained recovery from conflict.

The present report describes progress in the civilian capacity initiative since my previous report (A/66/311-S/2011/527). At the country level, the United Nations system organizations have been working together to support national ownership of priorities in post-conflict and post-crisis transitions. For example, in North Africa, they have supported national planning and the exchange of relevant experiences with other countries on such crucial issues as broad political dialogue and electoral processes. In Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, United Nations missions and country teams have worked together to support the development of nationally driven security and justice institution-building programmes.

Such country-level work underlines that civilian capacities and institution-building pathways cannot be imposed from outside but work best when programmes are designed to support a strong process of national decision-making. From these

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examples, it is evident that planning for United Nations support to national capacity-building also needs to adapt more systematically to national decision-making cycles.

While the civilian capacity initiative is ultimately focused on delivering stronger support in the field, the right systemic arrangements are needed to allow this to happen. In accordance with resolution 66/255, in which the General Assembly encouraged the United Nations to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise, the United Nations has worked closely with Member States and civil society organizations to develop a new online platform, CAPMATCH, which provides a simple mechanism to connect those seeking experience and capacity with potential providers. It offers the prospect of real innovation in technical cooperation by prioritizing real-life experiences of institutional transformation, in particular from the global South. It also offers the potential for strengthened global partnership in which South-South cooperation complements but does not substitute North-South technical and financial support.

Country-level work and partnerships over the past year have offered useful insights that can inform our future priorities. Country engagements have demonstrated the continuing capacity gaps identified by the Senior Advisory Group in the areas of safety and security, justice, inclusive political processes, core Government functionality and economic revitalization. Initial consultations regarding the online platform have revealed the value and variety of new sources of experience and expertise in those areas, but further targeted work will be needed to access those sources, particularly the capacities from the global South that are currently insufficiently documented and disseminated. Drawing on stronger expertise will work only when accompanied by adequate and sustained financing, including innovative models of voluntary funding, which can more systematically support South-South and triangular cooperation in the aftermath of conflict or crisis.

Complementing stronger national prioritization of needs and broader networks of expertise, the internal arrangements of the United Nations need to be coherent and sufficiently nimble to respond in volatile post-crisis circumstances. Working within the current regulatory framework, we are demonstrating how this can be done. In Libya, for example, in order to better support evolving national needs, we have used a phased approach to planning and budgeting for the mission. In Timor-Leste, we have drawn on the capacities of funds and programmes to help in ensuring the implementation of mandated capacity-building activities during the current transitional period. Organizational arrangements in the rule of law sector, specifically police, justice and corrections, have been strengthened through the assumption of a joint global focal point responsibility by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with co-located staff from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women).

Work over the past year has also underlined the importance of responsiveness to evolving national and operational requirements and of the scope for further enhancing nimbleness within the current regulatory framework. Relevant measures include supporting mission leadership in assessing evolving civilian capacity needs and redeploying resources to change the mix of civilian capacity, when required, further developing the use of Government-provided personnel for specialized, time-limited expertise and planning carefully with agencies, funds and programmes to

take full account of the capacity-building aspects of mandates. Work is also under way to develop more effective arrangements for the deployment of Secretariat staff to respond to emergency requirements.

Since my previous report, the civilian capacity initiative has benefited from close consultations with Member States through regional meetings, thematic exchanges and discussions in the Peacebuilding Commission. From such consultations have emerged many useful ideas — for example, a more widespread understanding that the experience of countries from the global South which had successfully built institutions that prevented conflict from escalating may be of help to countries in post-crisis situations. Such close collaboration will remain crucial as we continue towards our shared goal of providing stronger, more effective support to countries emerging from conflict.

I. Introduction

1. Recent events, including tensions in South Sudan and the Sudan, violence and political upheaval in Mali and the Syrian Arab Republic and transitions in Myanmar and Yemen, suggest that the need for timely, effective civilian capacities is becoming more urgent and the capacities required more complex. Those situations and many others demonstrate that the strength and accountability of national institutions are critical to successful recovery from conflict or crisis. As the Senior Advisory Group tasked with the independent review of civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict (A/65/747-S/2011/85) observed, "the journey from war to sustainable peace is not possible in the absence of stronger civilian capacity. Without this capacity, ... resilient institutions will not take root and the risk of renewed violence will remain." Member States have similarly emphasized in the General Assembly, Peacebuilding Commission, Economic and Social Council and Security Council the central importance of national capacity-building to sustainable peace.

2. In order to respond effectively to national priorities for institution-building, the international community needs to deliver the necessary civilian capacities quickly and effectively. The United Nations itself needs to be equipped with the right civilian capacities in the field, drawing on the full range of global expertise and deploying it efficiently, as a complement to military and police personnel. To meet these challenges, I commissioned the Senior Advisory Group to analyse how to expand the pool of civilian expertise to support the immediate capacity development needs of countries emerging from conflict. In my subsequent report (A/66/311-S/2011/527), I set out how the United Nations would take up those ideas.

3. In its resolution 66/255 on civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict, the General Assembly encouraged national Governments, the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including from countries with relevant experience in post-conflict peacebuilding or democratic transition. I welcome the close engagement of Member States in this agenda and the experience they bring to it.

4. Consultations with Member States on these issues have intensified accordingly since my previous report. Regional consultations have been held in Asia, hosted by the Governments of Indonesia and Norway, and in Africa, hosted by the Government of South Africa in collaboration with the African Union and facilitated by the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes. Further meetings are planned in Latin America and among the Arab States, the latter hosted by the Government of Morocco in collaboration with the League of Arab States. Consultations with the Peacebuilding Commission have highlighted the importance of South-South and triangular cooperation and the work of the Commission in developing national capacity and mobilizing resources for institution-building.

5. The present report sets out progress towards the priority actions identified in my previous report, overseen by a steering committee chaired by my Chef de Cabinet, Susana Malcorra. It also sets out the challenges for the next phase of the work, an important part of my broader agenda to deliver more effective support in situations of conflict and post-crisis recovery.

6. Much of the civilian capacity initiative will apply across the various responses of the United Nations system in the aftermath of conflict. Where humanitarian needs

persist in parallel with the beginning of recovery and development programming, humanitarian action will continue to be guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence.

II. National ownership

7. The importance of national ownership in achieving sustainable peace and development has come through clearly over the past year from countries in transition. The Group of Seven Plus successfully advocated in Busan, Republic of Korea, for a "New Deal" to support inclusive, country-owned and country-led transitions, while recognizing that transitioning out of fragility was a lengthy political process that required country leadership and ownership.[1]

8. National ownership depends on strong, inclusive and accountable national institutions. Supporting institution-building involves an inclusive process to determine priorities for the functions that build confidence between States and citizens and help to ensure sustainable peace. As highlighted in the New Deal, a single, strongly prioritized action plan is needed, one that covers the range of needs (political, security and development) and their political context and is nationally driven and backed by unified and sustained international support. Recent national peacebuilding plans show the importance that national partners attach to capacity-building in the five critical capacity gap areas; seven such plans[2] agreed in the past two years have prioritized institution-building in those areas. Actions involved go far beyond training to encompass strategic, legal and regulatory work by Governments; management and organizational reform; equipment and facilities; training and staff incentives; and accountability for performance, financial integrity and respect for human rights.

9. United Nations planning can support national capacity-building by following nationally determined priorities and fostering inclusive national dialogue that involves both Government and civil society. We need to recognize that national processes of decision-making often need time to reach a consensus on priorities. With regard to Libya, I proposed to the Security Council an initial mandate of three months to ensure that mission planning would be done in-country, fully involve the Government, and be based on a deeper understanding of needs. In non-mission contexts, country teams consult a wide range of interlocutors in order to build national ownership when developing United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks. Post-conflict needs assessments, supported by the United Nations, the European Union and the World Bank, are by their nature a joint process, proceeding only when full national ownership is assured. For example, the Yemen joint socioeconomic needs assessment was conducted under the framework of post-conflict needs assessments, informing the Government's prioritization process.[3]

10. While agencies, funds and programmes are instrumental in providing support to national capacity-building needs, United Nations peacekeeping operations and

[1] New Deal for International Engagement in Fragile States, endorsed at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011.

[2] For Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste.

[3] The needs assessment in Yemen was particularly useful in building the capacity of women leaders, as gender expertise and consultations with women's organizations and leaders were included throughout the process.

special political missions need to be equipped to respond to needs that fall within their mandated tasks and able to adapt to changing requirements. For example, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) faced dramatic changes in its environment over the course of 2011. Even where national contexts are more stable, such as in Liberia, specific needs for specialized civilian expertise evolve and urgent needs may arise during the year.

11. The appropriate extent of adaptation to processes of national decision-making will vary, depending on a mission's mandated tasks, the country context and the transitional nature of post-conflict political structures, as well as progress towards peace consolidation. Where mission mandates include capacity- or institution-building goals, national involvement and adaptation to changing national priorities are crucial for success. The revision of the integrated mission planning process guidelines currently under way is addressing how to reflect this dynamic in mission planning.

12. Some sectors important for peacebuilding tend to be underresourced in national budgeting processes and associated donor assistance, for instance in building police, justice and corrections institutions. Complementary to a clear political commitment to reform, a sector-wide approach to planning and budgeting can help to maximize the availability and use of funds, coordinate assistance and ensure sustainability by providing for recurrent financing in national budgets. The question of sustainability is being addressed, for example through the joint Justice and Security Programme in Liberia, the preparation of which was led by the Government of Liberia, and which is fully aligned with the Liberia Peacebuilding Programme. A policy note is being developed by the relevant United Nations entities to give practical support to senior policymakers in national Governments in planning such approaches and mobilizing stronger financing for them. I encourage United Nations field presences to participate actively in efforts by national authorities to implement such approaches.

13. In my previous report, I acknowledged the challenges of supporting national capacity development in conflict-affected situations. I asked an inter-agency working group led by UNDP to develop principles and guidelines for better using and developing national capacity in such contexts. The team conducted an extensive field survey, which brought to light the need for a system-wide framework for delivering capacity development support. The team is producing materials to help in ensuring that such support is based on national ownership and priorities, while acknowledging United Nations mandates and norms. Given that national capacity development is both a political and a technical process, the guidance will address the need to understand, engage with and build on national dynamics; to design support that fits its context; and to prioritize South-South exchanges of experience. The guidance will also cover the need to balance short-term and long-term results and to minimize any potentially negative impact of the international community on national capacity.

14. The Senior Advisory Group stressed the importance of assessing and drawing on national capacity, as is regularly done by the agencies, funds and programmes. For example, since early 2011 the Burundi country office of the World Food Programme has drawn on existing national capacity and mentored 50 Government staff in the collection and analysis of food security and nutrition data, with a view to handing over food security assessments and early warning functions to the

Government. In Uganda, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) drew on national expertise to support the Office of the Prime Minister, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and district authorities to develop a national supply and logistics system to support crisis prevention and response.

15. As for the use of national capacity in peacekeeping operations, on average two national staff are employed for every international staff member. Although international personnel may be necessary in certain roles, over two thirds of international staff work in mission support, a costly practice and one that misses potential opportunities for building sustainable national capacity that will remain after peacekeeping operations depart. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 66/264, the feasibility of nationalizing Field Service posts will be examined in the context of a planned review of the Field Service category of staff. In practical terms, this would mean identifying those functions that could be assigned to national staff; assessing the national capacities available and their readiness to implement those functions, including the training and mentoring needed; and, as appropriate, expanding the use of national contractors. The review will examine what can be learned from the use of national capacity by agencies, funds and programmes and how mission functions can be transferred to national counterparts as missions downsize.

16. Local procurement can contribute towards national capacity-building and expand the positive impact of United Nations field presences. In this regard, measures consistent with the principles of regulation 5.12 of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations continue to be taken. For example, vendor registration will be further simplified by the end of 2012 to allow for basic registration on the part of vendors participating in informal solicitation; the authority of missions to purchase core requirements suited for local procurement has been expanded in terms of the range of commodities; and the establishment of a regional procurement office in Entebbe, Uganda, as a pilot project has facilitated the identification and registration of new vendors from the region. Progress on those and other measures aimed at enhancing local procurement, including in post-conflict countries, will be further described in the comprehensive report on procurement activities to be submitted to the General Assembly at its resumed sixty-seventh session.

III. Partnerships and expertise

17. Countries emerging from conflict or crisis face the challenge of rebuilding or transforming institutions throughout Government and society. This is a long-term endeavour[4] requiring a broad range of civilian capacities, many of them highly specialized. As I emphasized in my previous report, to find these capacities we need to build partnerships with a broader range of potential providers, especially from the global South.

[4] The *World Development Report 2011* estimated that it took a generation to build adequate capacities and national institutions.

A. Networks of expertise

18. Regional consultations on civilian capacities held in 2012 in Asia and Africa, as well as those in New York on the rule of law and inclusive political processes,[5] have confirmed a particular interest among conflict- or crisis-affected countries in sharing and learning from others' comparable experiences. The consultations have provided many practical suggestions, including creating links with regional and subregional organizations, recognizing that countries can both request and provide capacities and involving countries that have carried out institutional reform in a conflict prevention context.

19. Practical examples of exchanges of experience include the work of UNDP to link policymakers in North Africa with reformers from Latin America and Eastern Europe who have gone through democratic transitions. This has involved Egypt and Tunisia exchanging experiences with Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Chile, Colombia, Mexico and countries in Eastern Europe on issues of political processes after authoritarian rule, constitution-making and transitional justice. UNDP and UN-Women supported a programme to train and deploy women leaders from Senegal and neighbouring countries to act as observers at polling stations and ensure women's participation in the presidential elections in Senegal in 2012. Brazil has provided support to the Community Violence Reduction Programme in Haiti.

20. Conflict-affected States that require capacity-building support in particular areas can be capacity providers too, drawing on their experience in other fields. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, UNDP and UNOCI are supporting the sharing of security sector reform experiences, including lessons learned, from Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Discussions are under way with the Peacebuilding Fund concerning possible support for a similar exchange involving Rwanda and other States. At the same time, Côte d'Ivoire has its own expertise to offer in such areas as economic governance and electoral systems. Similarly, Timor-Leste still needs institution-building support but has valuable experience in aid coordination, public finance and natural resource management.

21. It is not only the countries' post-conflict experiences that are valuable in this regard, but also their experiences in strengthening institutions and successfully preventing conflict from arising. Botswana, for example, has cooperated with Liberia on the capacity development of the Liberian police force.

22. Countries that have reflected on other experiences when designing their own institutional reforms may subsequently share their experience with others. In Morocco, for example, national decision makers exchanged views with transitional justice experts from South Africa and countries in Latin America on the design of truth commissions, reparations and public hearings. Morocco has since shared insights from its own process with others, including most recently with Yemen. In South Africa, while the process of institutional reform was similarly home-grown, information on other experiences, such as on the constitutional framework of India and transitional justice processes in Latin America, provided helpful input; the experience of South Africa has since been widely shared.

[5] Consultations on the rule of law held on 5 June 2012 were hosted by the Permanent Mission of Morocco to the United Nations and the New York University Center on International Cooperation, and those on inclusive political processes were held on 12 June 2012, hosted by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

23. However, there is insufficient systematic support for these types of exchanges, which are mainly, though not exclusively, South-South. While consultations with Member States have shown that those States have untapped capacities and experience to share, as do regional and subregional organizations, often there is a lack of documented knowledge as to where such capacities and experience lie.

24. United Nations missions, too, face challenges in finding the specialized civilian capacities that they need to fulfil their increasingly varied mandates. Such capacities are often required on a time-limited basis to fulfil clearly defined tasks. In that case, in-house capacities may need to be supplemented by additional specialized capacities deployed on a flexible, on-demand basis from Governments and other appropriate providers.

25. In some areas, in particular those where demand is changing and the United Nations is called upon to provide capacities that are highly specialized or require in-depth experience of the management of institutional reform, the challenge lies in locating such capacities, which are scarce and in high demand. For example, in the rule of law sector, support to the police now focuses as much on institution-building as on operational policing. This requires specialized expertise in specific areas. Such skills are a limited commodity in policing, where it is often civilian policing experts who manage police information management, communications, infrastructure, procurement and financial, forensic and other related systems. It is in part for this reason that the missions in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia have faced challenges in fulfilling national requests for assistance with forensic expertise and planning, management, and accountability systems. To fill these functions, there is a need to access a broader range of expertise, including police development experts, academics and trainers, retirees with appropriate skills or civilians working with Ministries of the Interior or Finance. An additional challenge is the need for mentoring and advising skills, for which the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is developing training materials and guidelines.

26. Gender expertise is another area where the United Nations needs to be able to access the right capacities to ensure that women's needs are adequately addressed in post-conflict peacebuilding. In a recent review of how gender expertise is structured and deployed in post-conflict contexts, undertaken by UN-Women in partnership with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, UNDP, UNICEF, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and OHCHR, it was found that there was no system-wide approach to identifying the gender expertise needed in the aftermath of conflict. A more systematic approach is needed to deploy adequate capacities for the effective implementation of women, peace and security commitments. The review also noted that gender advisers tended to be concentrated in gender units in the field; it was recommended that gender expertise be embedded within key peacebuilding sectors instead and that senior gender advisory capacity be located in the offices of my senior field leaders. I have asked UN-Women to work with relevant entities across the system to take these findings forward.

27. As one step towards accessing this broader range of capacities and facilitating new partnerships through which they can be deployed, we are developing an online platform, CAPMATCH, whose purpose is to better match the demand and supply of specialized civilian capacities in countries emerging from conflict or crisis, focusing on the five critical capacity gaps. Participants may register as a requester or provider

of capacities or both. The platform then offers potential matches for participants to pursue.

28. The platform aims to provide a simple, transparent source of information to help providers and requesters to connect. It will be accessible to Member States, regional organizations, United Nations missions and field presences and agencies, funds and programmes, as well as other potential partners, such as NGOs and training and rostering organizations. In order to avoid the problems inherent in keeping a global roster up to date, each organization will manage its own list of available capacities; individuals will not register directly. While the platform may provide an additional source of scarce or specialized capacities needed by United Nations field presences, it is not a selection mechanism for personnel and does not affect established procedures for United Nations staffing.[6]

29. The online platform is designed to foster greater cooperation among Government and non-Government entities that have direct experience in institutional reform for post-conflict peacebuilding or conflict prevention, in particular from the global South. While our work has revealed that such capacity and experience required are largely available among Member States,[7] it is becoming clear that reflecting this fully on the platform will require considerable time and effort. This is particularly true for Member States whose experience has not yet been documented or for States in which mechanisms to share their experience with others have not yet been established.

30. The online platform is currently managed by the civilian capacities team and supported by voluntary contributions. Depending on lessons learned from its initial phase, I intend to make proposals to the General Assembly on its future management and operations.

B. Funding for national institution-building

31. Discussions with national partners and United Nations field presences have underlined the point made by the Senior Advisory Group that funding and expertise are often difficult to mobilize for national institution-building. Many countries from the global South have underlined the need for stronger financial support to strengthen national institutions, including to help to finance South-South exchanges. The Peacebuilding Commission has also made this a focus of recent discussions.

32. A number of innovative financing models to support institution-building partnerships have emerged, such as offers from countries in the global South to partially finance exchanges of expertise complemented by triangular funding from donor countries. For example, Ghana and the Netherlands have jointly supported the institutional capacity strengthening of the Liberian immigration service, with training expertise and facilities from Ghana complemented by project funding from

[6] Due diligence procedures for the platform will include verifying with Member States that Government organizations seeking to register are bona fide Government agencies and applying affiliation mechanisms of the Economic and Social Council in the case of NGO registration.

[7] Several Member States have already expressed an interest in sharing their experiences in institution-building or reform on the platform. Training and rostering organizations may also have such capacity available. For example, the African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations has a standby roster of approximately 700 African experts, 40 per cent of whom have direct experience in post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding.

the Netherlands. UNDP has helped to develop such an arrangement in many country situations, including the partnership with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in South Sudan.

33. The Peacebuilding Fund already seeks to prioritize support to institution-building in national proposals. Some cases have illustrated the potential for closer partnerships with the international financial institutions and other entities to support longer-term institution-building programmes, such as the joint work between the Peacebuilding Fund and the World Bank on financing the joint Justice and Security Programme in Liberia and the Transitional Solutions Initiative in Eastern Sudan, a collective effort of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNDP, the World Bank and national partners, which aims to improve and diversify livelihood opportunities for long-staying refugees, while developing local government capacity and national ownership. The Peacebuilding Support Office is implementing a project funded by the European Union and aimed at strengthening aid information and coordination for peacebuilding. The project includes support and funding for exchanges with countries from the global South where aid information and coordination are more advanced.

34. Such voluntary funding is the only source of external financing for national institution-building in non-mission contexts. In mission contexts, such partnerships can allow a more comprehensive programme of support to national institutions and establish the basis for continued support, which will be needed as missions draw down. For example, the United Nations Environment Programme has partnered with the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone to address natural resource challenges, including supporting cooperation between the Sierra Leone Environmental Protection Agency and the Southern African Institute for Environmental Assessment.

35. I shall continue to work on the possibilities for expanding modes of financing national institution-building, in particular South-South and triangular exchanges, in the five critical capacity gaps. This will include liaising with the Peacebuilding Commission, other United Nations entities and external partners on how to fill gaps, improve the coherence and cost-effectiveness of assistance and maximize results.

C. Accountability

36. In my previous report I outlined a system of global focal points that would help to deliver more accountable and predictable capacities in critical capacity gap areas. Some general principles have now been developed. The principles are founded on a "two-tier" accountability system: focal points at Headquarters identify information, expertise and knowledge in their sector and ensure that adequate, timely capacities are supplied in response to country-level requests (e.g. people, knowledge and advice on assessments, planning, partnerships and financing). Some expertise may be deployed from the entity acting as the focal point, while some may be drawn from other entities and organizations within and outside the United Nations. Country-level programming and delivery remain the responsibility of United Nations entities in the field, coordinated by my special representatives or resident coordinators.

37. The rule of law sector[8] was considered the most urgent operational area to which to apply new global focal point arrangements, owing to high demand from Member States for United Nations services and a perception that the existing arrangements did not bring the necessary clarity, capacity and accountability to delivery of support in this critical area. After reviewing various options for strengthened institutional arrangements, I have decided that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP should assume joint responsibility as the global focal point for the rule of law sector (police, justice and corrections) in post-conflict and other crisis situations.

38. Under the arrangement, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP will be jointly responsible and accountable for responding to country-level requests for assistance channelled through United Nations entities on the ground. Ensuring closer collaboration between the Department, UNDP and other key partners through joint country-level assessments, planning, programming and monitoring will be a priority. The Department and UNDP will liaise with all relevant United Nations entities and their police, justice and corrections capacities in order to provide coordinated support, drawing upon their various comparative strengths, capacities and networks of expertise. Particular attention will be paid to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and OHCHR, given the importance of operational support and evaluation of progress of the criminal justice system in their mandates; to the specialized roles and mandates of such agencies as UNICEF, UN-Women and UNHCR; and to the Department of Political Affairs, in the context of missions led by that Department. I have asked the Deputy Secretary-General to review the existing institutional arrangements in the wider rule of law area, within which the appropriate relationship of the global focal point with other entities, task forces and coordination mechanisms will be determined.

39. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP are co-locating staff to support and constitute the Headquarters global focal point arrangement. This co-location will help to create a sense of partnership and collaboration and facilitate more effective country-level support, including joint programming. For that reason it should be mirrored, wherever possible, by co-located arrangements in the field. OHCHR and UN-Women have also decided to co-locate staff, while UNODC has expressed interest in collaborating on country programming and data analysis.

40. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNDP are developing a joint workplan and a joint funding approach aimed at improving the coherence and transparency of funding and enabling the global focal point to support this sector of growing demand. I urge Member States to support this approach so that the synergies to be gained from these new Headquarters arrangements are underpinned by a coordinated strategic approach at the country level and adequate funding for activities and programmes.

41. As work to establish the global focal point progresses, I intend to keep Member States informed of any further developments regarding the operationalization of the arrangements, including through the appropriate governing

[8] For the purpose of the present report, the rule of law sector comprises the relatively narrow area of police, justice and corrections. Justice includes the judiciary and non-formal dispute resolution systems, such as community-based mechanisms to resolve family, land and property disputes. Inputs to constitutional processes are considered under the critical gap area of inclusive political processes.

bodies. I also intend to learn and apply lessons from the establishment of the global focal point to other critical capacity gap areas.

42. Senior leaders will be responsible and accountable for ensuring that global focal points respond to country-level requests for assistance. I expect them to commit to a transparent, country-driven measurement of this service and to clearly express this accountability in their management compacts. In the same vein, in my previous report I committed to holding senior leaders in the field accountable with regard to the shared goals of the United Nations system at the country level. The guidelines for management compacts of heads of missions do indeed provide for accountability with regard to shared objectives. Where applicable, the integrated strategic frameworks, which include jointly agreed goals, provide an objective measure of performance in this area and should be used accordingly.

43. Similarly, mutual accountability among the leaders of United Nations field presences is crucial, and contributions to the accomplishment of shared goals should be part of each agency's system for evaluating the performance of senior leaders in the field. The implementation of the management and accountability system should be reviewed regularly in the United Nations Development Group, so that this important tool is not allowed to lag; I have requested the executive heads of the agencies, funds and programmes to accelerate implementation.

44. The Senior Advisory Group touched upon issues of gender balance in United Nations staffing in its report and called for greater accountability of senior field leaders with regard to gender equality. New data from 10 United Nations entities[9] show that in conflict-affected contexts we are well behind our global target of women holding 30 per cent of decision-making positions. In seven of those entities, women made up less than 25 per cent of senior management grades. Across United Nations missions, women hold only 2 of 17 Under-Secretary-General-level positions and 1 of 44 positions at the D-2 level. I remain committed to improving these results and have instructed the Department of Field Support to review this situation in consultation with UN-Women and to report to me in 2013 with specific recommendations to accomplish this. As requested in my previous report, UN-Women is working with the Department of Management to strengthen the accountability of United Nations senior leaders with regard to gender equality in the aftermath of conflict.

IV. Financial and managerial agility

45. In my previous report I emphasized the importance of timely support for capacity-building in post-conflict countries in order to avoid the risk of relapse into conflict and the consequent need for the ability to respond to evolving requirements. I continue to believe that many necessary improvements can be made within the current regulatory framework.

[9] The Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

A. Planning and budgeting

46. The adaptability of United Nations missions is important because operational circumstances evolve in volatile post-conflict settings, creating the need to adjust budgets that have been prepared almost a year before the start of the budget year. As outlined in paragraph 62 of my previous report, current arrangements do indeed provide some scope for reallocation, when necessary, after a budget has been approved. To ensure that senior managers are fully cognizant of this, both the responsibility to identify changes required for more effective mandate implementation and the parameters within which adjustments can be made have been articulated to my special representatives. This information will be integrated in training programmes for heads of mission and their senior leadership teams.

47. Another factor is the need for missions to engage with and support nationally owned processes, which do not necessarily unfold in line with United Nations budgetary timelines. Whether owing to the evolution of the mission's internal assessment of how best to accomplish the mandate or to changes in national requirements, however, missions need to be able to adapt to changing needs and opportunities, including in the mix of civilian capacity.

48. The General Assembly recognizes that not all capacity needs can be fully identified long in advance, as illustrated in its approval of the provision for consultancies in the budget for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL). The budget provides funding for an estimated volume of services, enabling the responsive provision of specialized expertise in a range of thematic areas, as agreed with the Government of Libya. Because the provision is a financial one, managers can adapt the mix of expertise within the approved level of resources.

49. The ability of missions to adapt with respect to the principal form of civilian capacity in missions — posts — is more complex. From a budgetary point of view, civilian personnel are managed as both a financial amount and as the sum of all posts, each approved for a specific purpose. Within those arrangements, there is a need to ensure that adjustments can be made to the composition of capacity within the approved financial levels, especially during the early life of a mission, when requirements are fluid.

50. To bring about the necessary responsiveness to changing civilian capacity needs, the Senior Advisory Group recommended that heads of mission be authorized to reallocate 20 per cent of the provision for civilian personnel. Rather than propose any specific threshold for adjustment, I believe the key issue is to facilitate change in the mix of capacity, when needed, to support mandated tasks in dynamic field settings. Specifically, I will stress to heads of missions their responsibility to monitor the evolution of civilian capacity requirements and to make necessary adjustments in the mix and type of capacity, while applying established procedures concerning redeployment of resources within and between expenditure categories. Any changes made would be reported in the performance report and, if those changes need to be continued, would be presented to the General Assembly in the context of the subsequent budget proposal. Furthermore, future budgets would include Government-provided personnel in the civilian personnel expenditure category, rather than in the operational costs category. This would provide a more transparent presentation of civilian capacity resources and facilitate adjustments among sub-items.

51. Where the definition of staffing requirements is still evolving, proposals for general temporary assistance could be more appropriate than establishing posts as a measure to balance the need of the General Assembly to consider the organizational structure and personnel requirements of a peacekeeping operation with the need to accommodate changes during budget implementation. This can facilitate the management of capacity needs within the approved financial levels.

52. I undertook in my previous report to refine the standard funding model for the first year of a new peacekeeping operation, in order to provide explicitly for changes in the mix of civilian capacity. As the General Assembly decided in its resolution 66/264 that any further development of a standard funding model should take into account the evaluation of its first application in the initial budget of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, no recommendation is made at this time. However, I believe that the principles that underpin the standard funding model better provide for the adaptability needed to change the mix of capacity in the early life of a mission. I intend to analyse this issue further and address it in the assessment of the experience with the standard funding model that will be presented to the Assembly at its sixty-seventh session, in the context of the progress report on the implementation of the global field support strategy.

53. With regard to mandates that emphasize support to national processes and related capacity-building, I will work to ensure that missions work closely with the various United Nations system entities to foster an integrated approach to carrying out these aspects of the mandate. Furthermore, it is necessary to recognize in the formulation of mission budgets that support for national processes and capacity-building may require a broader mix of inputs than do some other substantive areas of the mission, for which the budgetary provision is often limited to personnel.

B. Access to capacities

54. Paragraphs 17 to 26 above set out the circumstances in which a range of civilian capacities is required in post-conflict situations and the importance of specialized or contextually relevant expertise, such as other countries' experience of transition and reform. United Nations field missions require modalities that enable access to the necessary expertise. The further measures I envisage build on the policies and modalities already in place.

55. Staff deployment is clearly the central means of equipping missions with civilian expertise. However, there is often a need for timely specialized expertise that may be unique to a country or region, niche functions for which there is no continuing Secretariat requirement or capacities that are not readily available within the United Nations, particularly where needs are urgent and/or time-sensitive. An example is the deployment of corrections experts from Jordan as Government-provided personnel to Libya for short-term assignments to support institutional reform in the Libyan corrections service, in line with the UNSMIL approach of drawing on external capacity for specific, time-limited assistance.

56. One important avenue for widening the pool of specialized expertise is to draw more effectively on the relevant experiences of Member States in institution-building and reform. I therefore envisage making further use of Government-provided personnel as experts on mission for time-limited, specialized functions that are not required on an ongoing basis in the Secretariat or are not readily available,

without any expectation of longer-term United Nations engagement. This modality is based on the arrangements to obtain police officers, under which the providing Governments pay the salary while the United Nations pays the mission subsistence allowance and travel costs, and is also applied to corrections and judicial expertise. It could also be used for other specialized civilian expertise, which would be solicited by means of notes verbales.

57. In order to address the need expressed by the General Assembly[10] for greater clarity in resource proposals and the criteria for determining whether Government-provided personnel with the status of expert on mission should be recruited, I will develop guidelines to govern the recruitment of such personnel to ensure a clear and consistent approach within the Secretariat and report thereon to the Assembly.

58. In cases where the requirement is for competencies best accessed from Member States in the form of integrated teams rather than individuals, I would also solicit interest by means of a note verbale with a view to entering into arrangements with the Member States concerned on the basis of the same financial arrangements that apply to individual Government-provided personnel. I intend to assess the possibility of entering into arrangements to access specialized expertise from international organizations, such as the African Union, and to report thereon to the General Assembly.

59. Consultants are another well known vehicle for specialized expertise. Work is now under way to launch a central database of consultants, to be rolled out at various duty stations in 2013. It will offer a platform for transparent and accessible contracting of individual consultants on a global basis and can support the pre-screening of experts in thematic areas required by missions, so as to facilitate the rapid mobilization of expertise. This should enable greater access to expertise and experience from the global South.

60. A further measure that would deepen partnerships and facilitate access to needed specialized expertise is to make standing arrangements with roster managers to mobilize expertise for specialized roles that the United Nations does not intend to recruit directly, or for specialized, short-term, urgent needs. Such entities as the African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations and the Norwegian Refugee Council maintain rosters of specialized expertise that can be deployed at short notice, and some capacity providers populate their rosters with experts from both the North and the South. While such structured arrangements have been developed to support humanitarian responses, they are not applied in the case of field missions. Taking into account the need for access to the relevant experience and expertise from the global South, I intend to develop procedures to enable such standing arrangements and to report on progress to the General Assembly at its sixty-eighth session.

61. The issue of comparative advantage relates to directing resources to the actor best equipped to carry out a mandated task. This needs to take account of both institutional roles and specific contexts. As a step in this direction, and in the belief that the identification of the entity best equipped to undertake a task should start during initial mission planning, the revision of the integrated mission planning

[10] In its resolution 66/264, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, including those on the subject (see A/66/718, para. 58).

process guidelines will be aimed at further assisting mission planners to define respective roles and responsibilities and the resources required to carry them out. Meanwhile, as the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste begins to draw down, a small set of mandated capacity-building work is being carried out on its behalf by UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, and UN-Women. This should offer lessons for the future.

62. With respect to facilitating the flow of financial resources, I am pleased to report that the Secretariat has signed an agreement that allows the Peacebuilding Fund to support applicable activities carried out by the Secretariat. Furthermore, steps are being taken in the Secretariat to rationalize and implement a readily understandable and transparent schedule of programme support cost rates based on clearly defined criteria. In accordance with this schedule, voluntary contributions to trust funds managed by integrated missions would be charged the support cost rate applicable to contributions in support of inter-agency and "Delivering as one" programmes and of collaboration with other multilateral institutions where valid inter-agency arrangements apply. The current rate is 7 per cent.

C. Corporate emergency model

63. The Senior Advisory Group recommended the development of a model to enable more rapid and reliable deployment of Secretariat staff to respond to "corporate emergencies". In my previous report, I undertook to pursue the recommendation to establish a roster of trained, rapidly deployable Secretariat staff as a measure to strengthen our ability to respond to emergencies.

64. United Nations humanitarian entities have developed arrangements for triggering an emergency response, mobilizing resources and deploying personnel in crisis situations. In other circumstances, the analysis conducted in past months has found that the Secretariat is often challenged to deploy staff quickly enough in a crisis. Where the capacity exists, it is often not identified quickly enough, and when it is identified managers are often reluctant or slow to release their staff. One reason is that the deployments are not planned or anticipated. Another is linked to the challenges of backfilling the resulting vacancy.[11] Even when capacity is deployed, at times it cannot be retained in situ for an adequate duration.

65. To address these shortcomings, it is envisaged that an emergency staff deployment facility will be established, consisting of a pool of pre-cleared and pre-trained candidates for rapid deployment. The pool would be populated through a general call for Secretariat or mission-eligible staff who are cleared by a central review body and committed in advance to deploying within 72 hours of a request for a defined period. A robust roster mechanism would help to address the challenges of quickly identifying and releasing staff on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, to address the continuity and retention of in situ staff capacity, short-term emergency deployments could be complemented by a greater use of temporary assignments (for periods beyond three months), where relevant.

66. The emergency staff deployment facility has been conceptualized based on best practices within the United Nations system and other international emergency

[11] The primary challenge is backfilling vacancies created by staff on travel status where the post costs are not covered by the receiving offices.

response organizations that maintain such rosters. Taking into account the arrangements that have been developed by United Nations humanitarian entities, I will submit a proposal for the establishment and functioning of the facility and the related resource requirements.

V. Conclusions

67. We have made useful progress since my previous report towards strengthening civilian support for sustainable peace and development. Our consultations with Member States and our work with United Nations presences in the field have confirmed the central importance of effective and legitimate institutions in preventing relapse into conflict. As the Senior Advisory Group pointed out, "unless conflict-affected communities can develop their own abilities to cope with crisis and change, international assistance will not succeed" (A/65/747-S/2011/85). Providing the necessary support requires the United Nations in the field to be equipped with appropriate, timely, specialized civilian capacities that are sourced through a broader range of partnerships. It is a collective effort that requires the political commitment of national partners and capacities, expertise and funding from Member States.

68. Some of the practical steps that we have taken include:

(a) Launching the initial phase of the online platform to better match the supply and demand of capacities. In addition to providing immediate information about potential capacities and a starting point for new partnerships, the platform should foster networks across which expertise and experience can be shared, promoting greater South-South cooperation. I encourage Member States to participate in the platform;

(b) Creating a global focal point for the rule of law sector (specifically police, justice and corrections). Bringing greater coherence to the system's capacities, networks and expertise will help to improve our delivery in the field and create the necessary clarity and accountability in this critical area. I encourage Member States to support these new arrangements accordingly;

(c) Making use of the scope of the current regulatory framework to allow the United Nations to respond more nimbly to evolving national and operational requirements, as outlined in paragraphs 46 to 53 above. This includes the ability to change the mix of civilian capacity as circumstances require, examining alternatives to the premature formulation of detailed, mission-specific staffing tables, empowering senior leaders to manage resources in a way that maximizes responsiveness to national needs and planning carefully with agencies, funds and programmes to take full account of the capacity-building aspects of mandates;

(d) Making use of Government-provided personnel with the status of expert on mission for time-limited capacity requiring specialized skills without any expectation of longer-term engagement, as outlined in paragraphs 56 to 58 above;

(e) Progress towards other goals identified in my previous report, including guidelines for supporting capacity-building, stronger direction with regard to new planning processes to support national ownership, a review of how gender expertise is deployed and the development of a corporate emergency model.

69. The priorities for the future include ensuring that the online platform matching capacity supply and demand includes the widest possible range of relevant experience and capacities and refining the platform on the basis of initial feedback; learning from the new global focal point arrangements how clarity and accountability might be improved in other key areas; exploring innovative models for voluntary funding that can more systematically support South-South and triangular cooperation for institution-building in the aftermath of conflict or crisis; and increasing the interoperability of staff and systems to allow the use of resources and capacities from across the United Nations system and maximize efficiencies in the field. I will also continue to re-examine administrative arrangements, operating procedures and working methods to ensure that they support the responsiveness required of the United Nations in post-conflict situations.

70. I greatly appreciate the strong interest and collaboration that Member States have shown in the civilian capacity initiative. This work is not an end in itself. When people struggle to replace the battlefield with strong, inclusive and accountable institutions as the place to resolve differences, they deserve our support. Together we should empower rather than supplant their endeavours. I look forward to continuing our joint efforts to do so.

VI. Action to be taken by the General Assembly

71. The General Assembly may wish to take note of the present report.